Integrating OpenID Connect in Web Apps: Authentication Flow and Security

Written By:
Founder & CTO
June 18, 2025

In the age of modern application development, developers are increasingly shifting toward more secure, standardized, and scalable authentication mechanisms. One such method that has emerged as a trusted identity protocol for web applications is OpenID Connect (OIDC). Built as an identity layer on top of OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect simplifies identity verification and provides robust protection against common security vulnerabilities.

This blog will guide you through OpenID Connect’s authentication flow, explain how to integrate it securely in web apps, and highlight security best practices tailored specifically for developers. You’ll gain an in-depth understanding of how OIDC works under the hood, why it’s better than traditional methods, and how to leverage it for both usability and airtight security.

1. Understanding the OpenID Connect Authentication Flow

Integrating OpenID Connect in web apps begins with understanding its core architecture and how identity is authenticated. OpenID Connect acts as a secure identity layer on top of OAuth 2.0, enabling applications (also called Relying Parties or RPs) to authenticate users through an OpenID Provider (IdP) like Google, Microsoft, Okta, or Auth0.

The following steps form the backbone of the OIDC authorization code flow, particularly suitable for server-rendered applications and SPAs when combined with PKCE:

Step 1: User is Redirected to the Identity Provider

When a user chooses to log in, the application redirects their browser to the identity provider’s authorization endpoint. This redirect request includes key parameters:

  • client_id – Identifies your app

  • redirect_uri – Where the IdP should send the user after login

  • response_type=code – Indicates that the app wants an authorization code

  • scope=openid profile email – Specifies the desired scopes (required to retrieve user information)

  • state – A random string used to prevent CSRF attacks

  • nonce – Protects against token replay attacks

This is the critical first step in initiating the authentication process securely and aligns with best practices for handling user identity in a modern web app.

Step 2: User Logs into the Provider

At this point, the user sees the login screen of the identity provider. They enter their credentials, username, password, or multifactor authentication, and authenticate directly with the provider. This is important: your web application never touches the user’s password. This design significantly reduces the attack surface and offloads complex identity management to trusted providers.

Step 3: Authorization Code Is Returned to App

If authentication is successful, the provider redirects the user back to the redirect_uri you specified earlier. This redirect includes:

  • The authorization_code – a temporary credential

  • The original state – which you must verify to prevent CSRF

At this point, you haven’t authenticated the user yet. You only have a code that proves the user has logged into the identity provider.

Step 4: Code Is Exchanged for Tokens (Backchannel)

Your web app’s backend now performs a server-to-server POST request to the provider’s token endpoint, securely exchanging the authorization code for:

  • ID token – A JWT that contains user identity information (like name, email, and user ID)

  • Access token – Used to access protected APIs

  • Refresh token (optional) – Used to refresh access without user interaction

During this exchange, your app also presents its credentials (either a client secret or a PKCE code verifier). This backchannel ensures that only your server can obtain the actual identity and session tokens.

Step 5: ID Token Is Verified and User Is Logged In

Now that you have the ID token, you need to verify its integrity. This includes:

  • Verifying the signature using the provider’s JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) endpoint

  • Checking standard claims such as:


    • iss (issuer) – should match your IdP

    • aud (audience) – should match your client_id

    • exp (expiration) – must not be expired

    • nonce – must match the value sent earlier

Once the ID token is verified, your application can extract the user’s identity from the token and establish a session, usually via an HttpOnly session cookie.

Step 6: Accessing APIs and Maintaining Session

With the access token, your app can now make secure requests to APIs that require authentication. The access token must be included in the Authorization header (as a Bearer token). Because the token is short-lived, you can use a refresh token (if provided) to obtain a new access token when needed.

Step 7: Logout Process

When the user logs out, your app should:

  • Clear the session (invalidate cookies or server-side session data)

  • Redirect the user to the provider’s end_session_endpoint (if supported) to log out of the identity provider as well

This ensures a proper logout flow and eliminates potential session persistence across apps in SSO setups.

2. Authorization Code Flow with PKCE: Why It’s Critical

While the traditional authorization code flow is already secure, PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) makes it even more resilient, especially for public clients like SPAs, mobile apps, and any frontend that cannot securely store a client secret.

Why PKCE Is Needed

Imagine an attacker intercepts the authorization code during the redirect. If your app doesn’t use PKCE, that code could be exchanged for tokens by anyone who obtains it. PKCE eliminates this risk by:

  • Creating a code verifier (random string) before redirect

  • Hashing it into a code challenge, which is sent to the IdP

  • Later, the code verifier must be presented during token exchange

The IdP checks if the verifier matches the original challenge before issuing tokens. If they don’t match, the request is rejected.

How to Implement PKCE
  1. Generate a cryptographically random string (43–128 characters) on the client

  2. Hash it using SHA-256 to produce a code challenge

  3. Store the verifier client-side temporarily (never send it until the backend token exchange)

  4. Send the code challenge to the IdP with the login request

  5. During the token exchange, send the original code verifier

Using PKCE in combination with secure backend handling ensures that even if an attacker gains access to the authorization code, they still cannot exchange it for tokens.

3. Security Best Practices for OpenID Connect Integration

Implementing OpenID Connect securely goes beyond just following the flow. Developers must adhere to industry-grade security practices to ensure user sessions and identity data are protected from misuse, tampering, and unauthorized access.

Use HTTPS Everywhere

Every communication with your identity provider, authorization endpoint, token endpoint, redirect URIs, must occur over HTTPS. Unencrypted HTTP traffic is highly vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, token theft, and credential interception.

Strict Redirect URI Whitelisting

Always register and strictly validate your redirect_uri. Do not use wildcards or dynamically generated URIs. Accept only pre-approved URIs to prevent open redirect attacks, which are often exploited in phishing or token theft scenarios.

Always Verify State and Nonce Parameters

The state parameter prevents cross-site request forgery (CSRF), and the nonce prevents replay attacks on ID tokens. These values should be securely generated per login request and verified once the response returns.

Verify Token Signatures and Claims

Use the JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) provided by the IdP to verify ID and access token signatures. Also validate the integrity of claims like iss, aud, and exp. Failure to verify tokens leaves your app vulnerable to impersonation and session hijacking.

Use Short-Lived Tokens with Refresh Flow

Access tokens should have short expiration times (e.g., 5–15 minutes). Longer tokens are more dangerous if compromised. Combine this with the refresh token flow to maintain seamless user experience while preserving security.

Secure Secret Storage

Store client secrets and refresh tokens in secure backend environments, never in frontend code or localStorage. Use vault systems or encrypted environment variables and rotate secrets periodically.

Limit Scopes to What You Need

Request only the minimal OIDC scopes required: typically openid, profile, and email. Avoid requesting write-level or admin access unless absolutely necessary. This is part of least privilege access control.

Revoke Tokens on Logout

Always call the IdP’s token revocation and logout endpoints when the user logs out. This ensures sessions are terminated fully and cannot be reused from another browser or tab.

Log and Monitor Authentication Activity

Implement audit trails and logging for authentication attempts, failed token validations, and session expirations. Monitor for anomalies like multiple refresh token reuses, IP mismatches, or brute-force attacks.

Use Trusted SDKs and Libraries

OpenID Connect is a complex protocol. Leverage well-maintained SDKs like:

  • openid-client for Node.js

  • Authlib for Python

  • Spring Security for Java

  • MSAL for Microsoft apps

Always keep these libraries updated and avoid rolling out your own token parsing or validation logic.

Validate Tokens at Resource Servers

If your app consists of multiple microservices or APIs, each service should independently validate access tokens. Never trust a token just because another service accepted it.

Advanced Enhancements for High-Risk Environments

Consider additional mechanisms like mutual TLS (mTLS), JWT-Secured Authorization Requests (JAR), and Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession (DPoP) for scenarios involving sensitive data or high compliance requirements.

4. Common Security Vulnerabilities in OIDC and How to Avoid Them

Even with a standards-based protocol like OpenID Connect, misconfigurations or implementation mistakes can expose your app. Key vulnerabilities include:

  • CSRF due to missing or invalid state

  • Token leakage via URL fragments or logs

  • ID token replay due to missing nonce

  • Incorrect signature validation

  • Token misuse from overly long-lived tokens

  • Exploitable open redirects

To combat these risks, use a defense-in-depth approach: strict parameter validation, short token lifetimes, PKCE, monitoring, and zero-trust validation at every layer.

5. Backend-For-Frontend (BFF) Pattern for More Secure Integration

One emerging best practice for web apps is using the Backend-For-Frontend (BFF) pattern. In this architecture:

  • The frontend never directly handles tokens

  • All OIDC logic happens on the server

  • The browser interacts only with the backend over secure, authenticated routes

This pattern:

  • Reduces XSS exposure

  • Simplifies token handling

  • Centralizes session control

A BFF approach is ideal for security-conscious apps that still need modern UX.

6. Summary: End-to-End Secure OpenID Connect Flow

Here’s what a complete secure OIDC flow looks like in production:

  1. Generate state, nonce, and PKCE values

  2. Redirect user to IdP authorization endpoint with values

  3. Authenticate user at IdP

  4. Receive authorization code + state

  5. Verify state, send code + PKCE verifier to token endpoint

  6. Receive and verify ID token and access token

  7. Create secure session (cookie, server session)

  8. Use access token for API requests

  9. Use refresh token securely (backend-only)

  10. Log out via IdP and clear session